Study on the Parallel Competition Governance Model of Multiple Subjects in the "Unveiling of the List of Commanders"

Authors

  • Hao Zhu
  • Xin Chen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v2n3.40

Keywords:

The Open Competition Mechanism to Select the Best Candidates, Static Championship, Dynamic 'Milestones', Post Auction

Abstract

Improving the " The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates " system to fully stimulate innovation vitality is the key to Improving the " The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates " system to fully stimulate innovation vitality is the key to implementing key core technology breakthroughs and accelerating the resolution of the " bottleneck " problem. This article investigates the practice of " The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates " in Sichuan Chongqing's scientific and technological research, and summarizes the policy texts of " The open competition mechanism " in Sichuan Chongqing. This article investigates the practice of " The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates " in Sichuan Chongqing's scientific and technological research, and summarizes the policy texts of " The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates " in various provinces and cities. amounts in the early stage of "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" and the selection of incentive models in the later stage of project supervision are the focus of attention for Sichuan's scientific and technological research. project supervision are the focus of attention for the "issuing party" and the government. Therefore, it is an important and urgent issue to explore the early stage list amount setting and post project supervision. early stage list amount setting and post project supervision of "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates", especially to effectively incentivize multiple "unveiling parties" to increase efforts and accelerate research, and to improve the "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" system design The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" system design to continuously promote cutting-edge technology research and development, and help achievetechnological self-reliance and self-improvement.In order to solve the problem of effectively encouraging the "unveiling party" to increase its efforts to accelerate the breakthrough of key core technologies under the fixed amount of the list, and effectively setting the amount of the list under the unfixed amount of the list to achieve the unity and unity of purpose. technologies under the fixed amount of the list, and effectively setting the amount of the list under the unfixed amount of the list to achieve the unity and self consistency of encouraging the "unveiling party" to make efforts to invest and avoid the need for the "unveiled party" to invest in the technologies. self consistency of encouraging the "unveiling party" to make efforts to invest and avoid its opportunism, this paper summarizes the "unveiling party" This paper summarizes the "unveiling party" parallel competition governance model as: static championship governance model Dynamic "milestone" governance model and post bidding governance model, and modeling and numerical control of the "unveiling party". model, and modeling and numerical simulation of the interactive behavior of the "publishing party" and "publishing party" during the operation of "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates". open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" under the three governance models, respectively Research has found that the three types of governance models have their own applicable scenarios, influenced by factors such as pay gap, marginal R&D costs, volatility of scientific research output, and observability. For example, the static championship governance model is suitable for ranking projects with shorter cycles and higher observability of results; the dynamic "milestone" governance model adopts adopts a more flexible approach. For example, the static championship governance model is suitable for ranking projects with shorter cycles and higher observability of results; The dynamic "milestone" governance model adopts node assessment and survival of the fittest, which is suitable for ranking projects with shorter cycles and higher observability of results. For example, the static championship governance model is suitable for ranking projects with shorter cycles and higher observability of results; The dynamic "milestone" governance model adopts node assessment and survival of the fittest, which is suitable for ranking projects with high difficulty, long cycles, and can be divided into typical stages; The post auction governance The post auction governance model helps to reasonably determine the amount of the list and avoid opportunism behavior, and is applicable to projects where the government or the " issuer" cannot accurately estimate the amount of the list and avoid opportunism behavior. issuer" cannot accurately estimate the R&D cost due to difficulties in technical prediction. Based on this, this article proposes suggestions for optimizing and improving the governance mechanism of R&D cost. optimizing and improving the governance mechanism of key core technology breakthroughs in terms of improving the "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" listing mechanism, improving the "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" organizational management, and optimizing the "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" organizational management. management, and optimizing the "The open competition mechanism to select the best candidates" incentive mechanism.

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Published

17-04-2024

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Articles

How to Cite

Zhu, H., & Chen, X. (2024). Study on the Parallel Competition Governance Model of Multiple Subjects in the "Unveiling of the List of Commanders". International Journal of Social Sciences and Public Administration, 2(3), 283-296. https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v2n3.40