The Criminal Intent in American Criminal Law and its Special Provisions in Murder

Authors

  • Zhiyu He

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v2n3.01

Keywords:

American Criminal Law, Murder, Criminal Intent, Malice Aforethought

Abstract

In American criminal law, criminal intent is an essential element of crime, which determines the precise accusation of this crime or that crime, and even the total difference from guilt and innocence. In criminal law legislation, criminal intent is usually divided into general intent which is the least requirement to accuse a crime, and specific intent which is only necessary for some particular crimes. As for the conviction and sentencing of murder, there was no such general or specific crime intent requirement in early common law, that is, as long as the actor illegally caused the death of others even with no intent to kill, he could be prosecuted of murder. With the development of criminal law in the United States, the actor’s intention and motive when the crime committed gradually stand out and become an important factor of sentencing, which produces a series of special provisions on criminal intent. On the basis of general intent of American criminal law, this article mainly analyzes the specific intent and its special provisions of murder laws, and points out that premeditation and malice aforethought are the important criterions for judging the type and severity of murder in most American states.

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Published

17-04-2024

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Section

Articles

How to Cite

He, Z. (2024). The Criminal Intent in American Criminal Law and its Special Provisions in Murder. International Journal of Social Sciences and Public Administration, 2(3), 1-8. https://doi.org/10.62051/ijsspa.v2n3.01