Physical Damage to the Circuit Overview Based on FPGA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.62051/ijcsit.v3n3.38Keywords:
FPGA, Hardware Security, Hardware BackdoorAbstract
At present, the main hardware vulnerabilities of FPGA come from the security threats of hardware backdoors. A hardware backdoor is a malicious circuit planted in an FPGA that, if activated, will cause the FPGA to perform unintended functions. The hardware backdoor is composed of trigger and payload. When the condition of the trigger is satisfied, the malicious function will be realized through the payload circuit. Hardware backdoors often result in data errors, functional failures, information leaks, unauthorized access, and even shortened lifetime of FPGAs.
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