Stopping in Time: Prospect Theory and The Failure of Deterrence Policy

Shiyu Chen

doi:10.62051/ijgem.v5n1.10

Authors

Shiyu Chen

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.62051/ijgem.v5n1.10

Keywords:

Prospect Theory, Deterrence Policy, Japan, WWII

Abstract

The failure of deterrence policies in minimizing ongoing threats often occurs when traditional frameworks, which predominantly rely on cost-benefit calculations, prove inadequate. Most existing studies are anchored in these static models, focusing primarily on the immediate calculations of cost and benefit. However, such an approach overlooks the importance of a more dynamic understanding of decision-making processes, which are inherently fluid and responsive to shifts in environmental perceptions. This research seeks to address this gap by providing a dynamic analysis of Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbor. By utilizing secondary sources from archival materials, this study aims to offer a more comprehensive explanation of how changing perceptions influenced Japan's strategic choices, contributing to the broader discourse on the limitations of deterrence policies.

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