

A Review of Research on Russia's Strategic Adjustment to the West under the Background of Russia-Ukraine Conflict

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Abstract. This study aims to analyze Russia's strategic adjustment to the West under the background of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and to sort out and analyze the articles related to Russia's strategic adjustment to the West in Chinese core journals and foreign journals from 2022 to 2024. This paper summarizes the views of domestic and foreign experts and scholars, and believes that since Russia took special military action against Ukraine, the United States and Europe have imposed unprecedented sanctions on Russia. In order to survive and develop the country and maintain its national status and interests, Russia has made a series of strategic adjustments in economy, science and technology, diplomacy and other fields, and made a strong response and counterattack to the Western sanctions policy. To some extent, it has effectively hedged the huge pressure brought by the sanctions, and showed the stability and resistance of Russia's image as a major country to the international community.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine Conflict; Russia and the West; Anti-sanction Measures; Strategic Adjustment.

1. Introduction

Since the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia has been sanctioned by the Western world. On February 24, 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced special military action against Ukraine, and the Ukraine crisis has been comprehensively escalated. The United States and Europe have also increased their sanctions against Russia to an unprecedented extent, and took extreme measures to suppress Russia in many fields, which put Russia's social and economic development into an unprecedented predicament. In this case, Russia made counter-sanctions measures to fight back, strengthened efforts to promote its development, and achieved remarkable results in a short time. By combing the counter-sanctions and strategic adjustments of Russia in different fields, this paper believes that the sanctions of the Western countries have not reached their perfect expectations. Although Russia has been affected by sanctions to a certain extent, with its resource advantages, economic and social resilience, as well as counter-sanctions, Russia has effectively hedged the huge pressure brought by the Western sanctions, and the relevant counter-sanctions have also produced a "boomerang effect" which has an adverse impact on the West. Therefore, the study of Russia's strategic adjustment has great value and significance for our understanding of the international situation, the understanding of the logic of sanctions and counter-sanctions hedging, as well as for our country to learn from Russia's anti-sanctions experience and enrich the tools of anti-sanctions struggle.

However, most of the existing literature is aimed at the interpretation and discussion of Russia's strategic adjustment in a specific field, lacking more systematic sorting and analysis, and which can not form a more comprehensive view and theory of Russia's strategic adjustment. Based on this, this study integrates the specific measures of Russia's strategic adjustment in many fields, and summarizes these measures into three categories: the first category is the direct counterattack of the western sanctions to safeguard national interests; the second one is that Russia makes strategic adjustment in the diplomatic aspect under the pressure of western sanctions; the third is to seek survival and development.

2. Strategic Adjustment of Russia

2.1. Counterattacks on the West

2.1.1. Scientific and Technological Field

2.1.1.1 Nuclear Aspect

Russia uses nuclear threats to make the United States and NATO dare not intervene in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The United States has concluded that Russia will not use nuclear weapons rashly. It has repeatedly broken Russia's "red line", continued to provide weapons to Ukraine, and deepened its involvement in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, gradually pushing the Russia-U.S. game to the commanding height. Russia is also increasing its nuclear deterrence against the United States. In February 2023, Russia announced the suspension of the New START Treaty, and then in May, it announced the abolition of the CFE Treaty. Previously, the United States had already withdrawn from the anti-missile Treaty and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and later the United States and Russia have also withdrawn from the Open Skies Treaty. At this time, Russia's decision means Russia and the United States will no longer have rules and institutional constraints in the field of nuclear arms control. The two sides are tit-for-tat, and the risk of nuclear war is increasing. Scholar Huasheng Zhao believes that in the current situation, nuclear weapons are necessary for Russia. Russia will not give up nuclear threats, let alone bow to the Western powers. For Russia, if the United States and NATO continue to press hard, it can only continue to increase the degree of nuclear threats[1]. Russia has deployed its first tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus in June 2023, the first time since Russia's independence that nuclear weapons have been deployed abroad, meaning Russia can strike NATO from a third country.

2.1.1.2 Space Field

Since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, Russia and the United States have frequently imposed space sanctions and counter-sanctions. After the start of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has further deepened the sanctions against Russia, and Russia has also adjusted its space strategy to fight back. Scholar Li Huping has sorted out the process of Russia-U.S. space cooperation since the end of the Cold War, and combined with the current situation of bilateral space cooperation under the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and analyzed the status and trend of the two countries' space relations. The United States "cut off more than half of the high-tech exports to Russia, hit Russia's ability to achieve military modernization, and weakened its aerospace industry and space program[2]" and a series of space sanctions triggered Russia's counter-sanctions. Russia adjusted its space program, interrupted many space cooperation projects, announced the suspension of the supply of RD-180 rocket engines to the United States, and refused to repair the remaining rocket engines. Russia opposes the United States' continued participation in the Venus-D project, and says it will promote the project independently or in cooperation with China. This also reflects the change in Russia's strategic direction of seeking international cooperation to a certain extent. In addition, after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the bilateral space dialogue and exchange between Russia and the United States have been completely interrupted. Russia has resumed the manned moon landing program, and the trend of independently promoting the moon exploration program is obvious, which also reduces the possibility of participating in the U.S. lunar space station project[3].

2.1.2. Economic Field

Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the US and its Allies have adopted more severe sanctions against Russia in the economic field, and the financial field has become an important battlefield for Russia to compete with Western countries. In this case, Russia has also taken a series of countermeasures to fight back.

First, the settlement of gas trade in rubles for "unfriendly" countries and regions. In other words, if you buy Russian gas, "unfriendly" countries and regions must open ruble accounts in Russian banks. Buyers pay for the gas in euros or dollars and then ask the bank to convert it into rubles, or Russia

will cut off gas supplies. Shigui Tao pointed out that this ruble settlement order not only skillfully evaded the US and European dollar sanctions, bank sanctions, SWIFT sanctions and other laws, but also improved the attractiveness of the ruble, enhanced the degree of internationalization of the ruble. Most importantly, it completely reversed the depreciation trend of the ruble, the ruble exchange rate against the US dollar all the way up. It crushed attempts by Western countries to deplete Russia's foreign exchange reserves, fundamentally breaking the core objective of Western sanctions[4]. Russian scholar Salavatov Magomednabi described the implementation process of the measure and analyzed that ruble-settled commodities could eventually undermine the status of the US dollar as the world's main currency and possibly replace it[5].

Second, counter the energy price caps imposed by the United States and its Allies by prohibiting the supply of oil to countries that support price caps. At the same time, Russia has been trying to establish its own oil pricing benchmark and the United States and Western economic and financial sanctions have forced Russia to accelerate this process.[4] Russian scholar Fedor Tregubenko also spoke of this from the perspective of ensuring the sustainable development of Russia's fuel and energy complex[6].

Third, nationalization of foreign enterprises. Due to the sanctions imposed by the United States and NATO and other Western countries on Russia, many foreign companies continue to withdraw from the Russian market, and some have directly closed the relevant production channels. In response, Russia has listed 59 companies including Apple, Ikea, Microsoft, Volkswagen and other "anti-sanctions blacklist". These companies and their leaders will face the risk of "accounts and assets seizure, introduction of external management, property nationalization" and other risks[7]. They also restructured into nationalized enterprises, a move that severely hit back at these foreign companies.

2.1.3. Diplomatic Field

2.1.3.1 Public Opinion

Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and Western countries have manipulated their mainstream media to launch an international public opinion war against Russia, defining Russia's "special military operations" against Ukraine as a "large-scale war" in an attempt to isolate Russia. They also spread disinformation, criticize Russia and suppress the mainstream media in an attempt to undermine Russia's domestic political and social stability. In the face of such a fierce public opinion offensive, Russia fought back and quickly took countermeasures. On the one hand, Russia directly expelled some anti-Russian media from the United States and Western countries, and on the other hand, strengthened the top-level design of the public opinion war and fought for the initiative[8]. Sihan Lin divides top-level design into the following five aspects: First, the agenda designed by the Russian side is opposed to the agenda of the United States and the West. Second, Russia uses vivid "new labels" to expose the SINS of the United States and the West and to boost the morale of the Russian people. Third, Russia has seized the inherent contradictions of Western countries and used these contradictions to provoke the internal relations of Western countries. Fourth, maximize the support of international public opinion and build a united front of international public opinion. Fifth, give play to the vanguard and main force role of the Russian state media, carry out active public opinion campaigns, and seize the moral high ground.

2.1.3.2 Food Diplomacy

Food diplomacy refers to the diplomatic behavior of a country using food or food production factors through administrative intervention means such as trade, aid, embargo, etc., to achieve the government of the target country to comply with the open or undisclosed intention of the government of the food source country. Russia is a big exporter of grain, and food diplomacy is its important diplomatic tool. After the overall escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the Western sanctions on Russia have intensified, resulting in Russia's grain and fertilizer exports blocked, and stigmatized Russia, maliciously accusing Russia of obstructing Ukraine's grain and fertilizer production and exports, threatening international food security. Faced with sanctions, pressure and accusations, Russia has adjusted its food diplomacy strategy, urging the West to lift restrictions on its grain fertilizer

exports[9]. Russia directly refuted the accusations of planting evidence, and revealed that the West is seeking personal gains to lead to Ukraine's food security problems, pointing out that the West is the real driving force behind the rise in international food and fertilizer prices, and sanctions against Russia are actually aggravating the world food crisis. In the face of the unreasonable agreement on the Black Sea, Russia has also vigorously defended its interests and image by saying that it will not postpone it.

2.1.3.3 Governance of Global Health Security

Since 2011, Russia's participation in global health governance has shifted from "integration with the West" to "pursuit of dominance", and it has joined the three defense forces in maintaining regional health and biocomplex security. The three Defense Forces, namely the Russian Radiation, Chemical and Biological Protection Forces, have increased their monitoring of health and biological activities of Western countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia since the Crimea incident in 2014, fought against Western countries on hidden fronts and expanded international cooperation against infectious diseases. The three defense forces revealed the "story behind" the US-controlled Ukrainian laboratory, exposing the true purpose of the so-called "health security" and "biosecurity" in the United States[10]. According to Yi Xie, the reason why Russia has changed the path of participating in global health governance and increased the involvement of military forces is that Western countries led by the United States have neglected Russia's health interests, and Russia's health and biosecurity interests cannot be guaranteed, so it has to open up a new governance path and establish a health security mechanism that is independent of the West and centered on the surrounding region. Moreover, the United States and other Western countries refuse to actively communicate with Russia on the issue of biological laboratories, and have long said that Russia spreads "false information", so that Russia has to continue to increase the monitoring of the three defense forces and launch a public opinion game with the United States[11].

2.2. Maintenance of International Relations and Development of Diplomacy

2.2.1. Scientific and Technological Field

2.2.1.1 Space Field

Russia-US relations have deteriorated, and their space cooperation has continued to shrink. Russia has actively changed the strategy of cooperation target countries and continued to deepen space cooperation with China. Russia is also strengthening its space cooperation with emerging countries in an attempt to expand space market share and increase commercial revenue. For this point, Li Huping scholars analyzed that the interruption of Russia-US space cooperation projects has reduced Russia's space commercial income and increased its financial burden, which directly affects the development of the space industry and the implementation of the space program. In the long run, the scope of U.S. space sanctions on Russia will be wider, the possibility of resuming cooperation is very low, and traditional Russian partners such as the European Space Agency have also turned to the United States, and Russia's space market share has been compressed[3]. In addition, due to the continued deterioration of geopolitical relations and the acceleration of the construction of military forces in space, the space arms race has intensified, increasing the risk of falling into space security difficulties and the outbreak of conflicts. Therefore, Russia advocates space multilateralism in the international community, advocates the central role of the United Nations in space arms control negotiations, and advocates the development of legally binding international agreements to prevent an arms race in space, minimize potential conflicts, and maintain space security. This reflects Russia's sense of responsibility as a major power and establishes an image of maintaining peace.

2.2.2. Economic Field

The harsh economic sanctions imposed by the Western countries on Russia have accelerated the process of Russia's "turn to the East" strategy, that is, Russia has gradually abandoned Europe and other Western markets, sought to expand trade and economic ties with Asian countries, and shifted

its foreign policy focus to the East. Among them, the new progress of RMB internationalization in Russia is one of the concrete manifestations of Russia's "turn to the East".

Analysis by Wenhong Xu: The US and Europe restrict Russia's use of the US dollar and the euro as international currencies, making Russia face a currency dilemma, objectively forcing Russia to find new ways to break through currency sanctions in addition to the US dollar, the euro and other western currencies. In addition to actively promoting local currency settlement, the RMB has gradually become the preferred choice for Russia to break through currency sanctions. Russia has stepped up efforts to replace the dollar or euro with the yuan[12]. First, the status of RMB in the Russian economy is rapidly improving: the proportion of RMB settlement in bilateral trade between China and Russia is constantly increasing, and Russia is also increasing the use of RMB in trade with third parties; Second, the share of the RMB in the Russian capital market has increased rapidly; Third, the share of RMB in Russia's foreign exchange reserves and national welfare funds has further increased. Therefore, scholars believe that the initial status of RMB in Russia, as a major power in the world, has exceeded that of the US dollar and the euro, which is major progress in the global "de-dollarization" and is conducive to promoting the international monetary system from the dominance of the US dollar and the euro to multi-currency, regionalization and fragmentation[3].

2.2.3. Diplomatic Field

2.2.3.1 Orientation of Diplomatic Relations

Since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the United States and Europe have not only imposed severe sanctions on Russia, but also promoted the international community to comprehensively suppress and isolate Russia. In general, the orientation of Russia's diplomatic relations is to give up easing relations with the West, unite with non-Western countries, namely the Asia-Pacific region in Eurasia, the Middle East and Latin America, and actively expand diplomatic space to the east. Russia will build its geopolitical and economic influence in these regions, reshaping the space for regional economic integration.

Its specific diplomatic practice mainly includes the following aspects:

First, in international relations, Russia clearly fights Western, non-Western countries and international organizations. Russia has made a list of unfriendly countries and regions and is resolutely fighting against sanctions. Second, Russia actively participates in and hosts international multilateral conferences in order to maintain and enhance its influence and consolidate its dominant position in Central Asia. Third, in 2022, Putin visited Central Asia and the Middle East, developing friendly relations with Tajikistan, the five Caspian States, Iran, Turkey and other countries. Fourth, China-Russia relations have always maintained a sound momentum of development, pointing out that China and Russia have broad prospects for cooperation in many fields[13]. Vasily Kashin also mentioned many times in his analysis of China-Russia relations and prospects that "China will replace the EU as our main trading partner[14]."

In addition to the specific diplomatic practice, in the direction of strategic adjustment of foreign relations, Yonghui Li pointed out that the new direction of Russia's foreign strategic adjustment lies in the following: Russia has established important cooperative relations with Turkey, Iran, Africa and Latin American countries. It is also the result of Russia hedging its deteriorating relations with the West by developing relations with non-Western countries[15]. We need friendly relations with all countries that are willing to cooperate with us, including all countries in Africa, the Arab world, Asia and Latin America[5].

2.2.3.2 Foreign Trade

Russia actively develops trade cooperation with non-Western countries, in addition to the trade relations between Russia and the European Union, R. Akhmedzyanov mentioned a noteworthy point: trade relations have changed, and now Russia does not cooperate with the European Union, but with various countries, especially Germany, France and Italy. The commodity mix will not change much,

with the main export component being oil and petroleum products from the Russian Federation in exchange for imports of machinery and equipment from European countries[16]. The creation of new joint institutions, the development of new technologies and the search for common points of contact in order to reduce the number of economic, political and legal contradictions between the countries are necessary for the development of foreign trade relations between Russia and European countries[17]. Despite the existence of many economic sanctions and restrictions, the EU and Russia have continued to improve trade relations, and EU countries have also recognized the benefits of cooperation with Russia. It is particularly important to establish dialogue among States to further resolve protracted conflicts and contradictions[16].

2.2.3.3 Energy Diplomacy

In the context of the escalating crisis, the energy game between major countries has become more and more intense, and the global energy pattern has changed. Under the trend that Europe proposes to accelerate the “decoupling” of energy from Russia, Russia strongly promotes the “eastward shift” of energy, and the energy pattern of Eurasia is being reshaped. Russia, as a major energy exporter in the world, has taken a series of targeted measures according to the different focus directions of energy exports. In the direction of Europe, continue to maintain energy supply to Europe. In the Middle East, focus on expanding diversified cooperation with major energy countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, UAE); As to Asia, strengthen the traditional markets of energy export in the Asia-Pacific, such as China, India and other countries, vigorously open up new markets, and invite friendly countries to participate in energy projects; In terms of Eurasia, build a unified Eurasian energy space, focusing on strengthening energy cooperation and development in the eastern and northern directions of Eurasia[18].

2.2.3.4 Food Diplomacy

In addition to continuously refuting the relevant Western accusations, Russia has also adjusted the strategic direction of food diplomacy, shifting the focus of food and fertilizer exports to non-Western friendly countries, increasing the supply to friendly countries, maintaining strategic stability with these countries, and beginning to explore non-Western currency settlement methods. As a major net grain exporter, Russia has continued to participate in global food security governance under multilateral frameworks, flexibly carried out food diplomacy, faithfully fulfilled various food supply contracts, and demonstrated its willingness to shoulder international responsibilities by signing agreements on the export of agricultural products to ports in the Black Sea. At the same time, Russia is also a major player in international humanitarian aid, sending overstock fertilizer and food donations to African countries, contributing to the fight against global hunger and malnutrition, demonstrating its sense of responsibility and preserving the country’s image. Zhao Yuming stressed that in addition to obtaining economic dividends and ensuring food security, food diplomacy has increasingly become a strategic tool in Russia at present. As long as it can maintain stable production capacity and maintain its leading position in the world food market, food diplomacy will remain an advantageous field, main tool and effective means for Russia to develop relations with non-Western countries in the future[9].

2.2.3.5 Governance of Global Health Security

Yi Xie believes that the Russia-Ukraine conflict has made the space for cooperation between Russia and the West constantly under pressure, while Sino-Russian health cooperation has great potential. First, the two countries have common interests in health security and disease prevention and control cooperation in key areas. Both countries are indispensable members of the building of a “human health community” and a “human security community”. The two countries have complementary strengths in cooperation on non-communicable diseases and tuberculosis. Second, both China and Russia face containment and repression by Western countries in multilateral mechanisms, including the health security cooperation of the BRICS countries and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The infectious disease laboratory in the United States also poses a threat to global health security. In

this regard, scholars believe that China and Russia should unite emerging countries and deepen cooperation in global health governance[11].

2.3. Domestic Survival and Development

2.3.1. Scientific and Technological Field

2.3.1.1 Space Field

Despite the interruption of multiple space cooperation projects between Russia and the United States since the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the International Space Station project and the simulated lunar landing isolation experiment “Sirius” project have not been affected, because this is a trump card in the negotiations between Russia and the United States. Maintaining cooperation is conducive to Russia to coordinate funds into other space projects and make up for the gap in space technology.

Russia’s space autonomous force construction and space industrial chain supply chain have entered the “de-Americanization” stage. Russia has adjusted its space program, prioritizing the manufacture of dual-use satellites for military and civilian purposes, and has used the financial resources released by space cooperation projects with the United States for scientific and technological research and development, striving to achieve complete independence in key technologies[19]. Russia has also established a new industrial chain and supply chain system. Since the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia has implemented an import substitution policy, importing electronic components from China and Southeast Asian countries, reducing the impact of the United States’ normalized export control of Russian space technology. In addition, Russia has also deepened the cooperation between the government and space commercial companies to enhance the military advantage and resilience of space, in response to the US military threat in space, and accelerated the deployment of the “Sphere” satellite system to build a Russian version of the “Star Link” to enhance space situational awareness and military deterrence.

2.3.1.2 Digital Technology

Digital war has led to the evolution of Russia’s preset “blitz war” into a “persistent conflict”. Compared with Ukraine, which has the blessing of digital technology in Europe and the United States, the Russian army has a significant gap in intelligent and information-based combat capabilities. In view of the urgency of developing the digital economy, Russia has also made every effort to expand international cooperation, but with the evolution of the Russia-Ukraine situation, faced with the United States and Western countries’ comprehensive “digital sanctions”[20], Russia actively coordinated resources to explore a new path to break through the sanctions.

Sanctions have had a great impact on Russia’s existing industrial chain and supply chain of the digital economy. In order to “supplement the chain”, Russia has identified two paths of internal pooling of resources for import substitution and external integration of resources to expand trading partners, opening the import substitution 2.0 stage. Junmei Liu, Haoran Xu and other scholars sorted out specific measures in Russia[7]. At present, these measures have indeed effectively resisted Russia, improved its own digital technology self-research ability, and there has been no major fluctuation in economic operation.

2.3.2. Economic Field

The financial sanctions imposed by the United States and the West directly bring the risk of currency depreciation and inflation, directly affect normal international trade, investment, financial transactions and other activities, hitting Russia’s economic development capacity, which has affected not only the financial and commodity markets, but also the normal life of residents. In order to protect people’s livelihood and save enterprises, Russia has taken a package of measures to respond.

2.3.2.1 Financial and Commodity Markets

Comprehensive “de-dollarization”, the implementation of ruble settlement of natural gas in “unfriendly” countries and regions, the repayment of debts with rubles and the promotion of ruble anchoring of hard currency and other measures have also played a great role in stabilizing the financial and commodity markets. Russia has also made the following strategic adjustments:

First, the implementation of foreign exchange control for the first time, mainly includes appropriate increase in interest rates, control of Russian residents to “unfriendly” countries and regions for ruble loans, securities and other economic activities, control of related foreign exchange activities and transactions, control of Russian enterprises local registration, the development of new tax policies for foreign companies, etc. According to the analysis of scholars, these measures are conducive to offset the increase in the risk of ruble depreciation and inflation, stabilize the banking system, enhance the attractiveness of deposits, ensure that cash currency will not further outflow, and reduce the pressure of capital flight[4].

Second, legalization of parallel imports. That is, smuggled goods without customs duties and after-sales protection are allowed to flow into normal sales channels. Scholars believe that “parallel import” can help Russia avoid the shortage of production and living means, support the value of the ruble and curb price rises, promote the reconstruction of Russia’s foreign economic partnership[4], and help solve the problems related to the import of particularly important products[5].

Third, transform the economy away from over-dependence on energy resources. Junmei Liu analyzed that when EU countries made up their minds and successfully got rid of their energy dependence on Russia, it was the day when Russia was forced to start economic transformation due to heavy export revenue. It is advisable to get rid of dependence on energy income, achieve scientific and technological innovation, and achieve sustainable economic development[7].

2.3.2.2 Social Security

According to Peter Yakovlev, the core of a modern forward-looking macroeconomic strategy should be based on these three basic principles. First, the huge financial resources still available to the State should be used for targeted emergency investments in the economic and social fields. Priority should be given to infrastructure projects, science and technology, education and health care. Secondly, citizens’ incomes should be substantially increased, thereby greatly expanding the domestic market for the products of national producers who are required to implement import substitution strategies. Thirdly, there is a need to establish a minimum of social justice. There is a need to significantly limit the excess income that certain categories of citizens receive from the State budget.[21]In the Government’s anti-crisis measures, Salavatov Magomednabi also mentioned measures relating to social security: Russia is taking social support measures, paying monthly allowances to low-income families with children between 8 and 18 years of age, and setting aside funds to support employees of organizations who have been laid off (advanced training, professional retraining)[5].

2.3.2.3 Foreign Trade Logistics

The impact of sanctions on industry is mainly through the restriction of foreign trade logistics, border closure, which leads to the disruption of the logistics chain. Many import-dependent enterprises have direct problems in the production process. Many foreign companies withdraw from the Russian market. Russian industry is facing severe challenges.

In response to the pressure on imports, Russia on the one hand chose import substitution, T.N. Subbotina pointed out that enterprises quickly turned to the domestic market, mainly adopting three basic strategies: strategies based on innovation and opening up new markets, strategies to reduce and simplify, and strategies to increase production factors (capital and labor). Vigorously promoting the modernization of production and technology base helps to maximize the utilization of production capacity. The state actively invests in large-scale and long-term support for key industries and areas, such as the IT industry, transportation infrastructure, innovative technologies and regional production

clusters[22]. In terms of foreign trade logistics, Russia has also explored new transportation methods. Andrey Golubchik described in detail four ways to import supplies to Russia through the territorial organization of “friendly countries” using “agent buyers”.

2.3.3. Diplomatic Field

2.3.3.1 Energy Diplomacy

Oil price restrictions, embargoes and other sanctions pose a real challenge to the entire structure of economic activity of Russian fuel and energy companies. In order to ensure the further sustainable development and long-term stable operation of the fuel and energy complex of the Russian Federation, besides some countermeasures such as the rapid adoption of the “gas ruble” and the ban on the supply of oil to countries that support the price cap there have also been many comprehensive strategic adjustments, which Fedor Tregubenko summarized as follows:

First, further cooperate with China and other friendly countries in the field of oil and gas equipment and services in order to achieve technological independence in Russia; Second, accelerate import substitution in oil and gas engineering; Third, stimulate domestic demand for natural gas through the development of the gas and chemical industry, new production facilities in the field of mineral fertilizers, the gasification of Russian regions through liquefied natural gas and the use of natural gas as a vehicle fuel; Fourth, establish a favorable regulatory and tax regime for the implementation of strategic infrastructure projects, simplify regulation and supervision during construction, establish tax incentives for mineral extraction and reduce export tariffs; Fifth, the state funds projects in related industries such as shipbuilding to increase its own tanker fleet in order to improve the independence of transport[6].

2.3.3.2 International Institutional Competition

International institutions are “persistent and interrelated (formal and informal) rules” that “define roles, limit actions, and shape expectations[23].” In the final analysis, the nature of international system competition is the competition between countries, which is the competition between countries in the system supply capacity.

After the escalation of the Ukraine crisis, the relations between the United States, Europe and Russia are extremely tense, and the competition situation of the international system related to Russia has changed significantly. The existence of restrictive and confrontational measures and the neutral or vague stance of some organizations have increased the urgency, zero-sum and complexity of the competition of the international system. Russia has adjusted the competitive strategy according to the needs of different categories of combined interests. Scholar Gu Wei summarized the strategy from three aspects. When the crisis broke out and the situation was urgent, Russia gave priority to intra-system competition. However, when the competitive nature of the international system is obviously enhanced, Russia intends to reduce or even abandon the form of competition within the system and directly withdraw from the unnecessary international system. Under the influence of the prolonged war and crisis, Russia adopted the strategy of maintaining the status quo on intra-institutional competition, returned to inter-institutional competition, and attached importance to the international system that had a certain influence on Russia[24]. Scholars believe that Russia’s strategy adjustment is based on the change of the situation and the needs of national interests. In fact, the mode of pragmatic behavior has not changed fundamentally.

2.3.3.3 Food Diplomacy

In the face of Western sanctions, Russia’s weaknesses in food are more clearly visible, facing the risk of importing seeds, plant protection products and agricultural machinery from the West. Russia in the maintenance of food production capacity and export potential “right medicine” to enhance fertilizer exports and earnings capacity.

3. Summary

The research results of domestic and foreign scholars point out that Russia's counter-sanctions in multiple fields and at multiple levels have achieved obvious results. In the short term, these measures effectively resist the Western sanctions, reduce the national economic and political pressure caused by sanctions, stabilize the financial market, find an effective way to solve the import and export restrictions, and stimulate the national independent development capacity. To a certain extent, it has freed itself from dependence on the West and expanded into new trading partners. However, according to scholars' analysis, some measures have limitations in the long run, and the risks have not been completely resolved. For example, the withdrawal from some international institutions makes it lose the competitive platform and the channel to safeguard its own interests, which may be used by Western countries. Russia's economy has been in a state of negative growth and is still heavily dependent on energy. The economic transformation has not been completed, still facing greater economic risks. The strengthening of space military force construction is not conducive to space security and the implementation of bilateral space programs, etc.

Russia has provided the world with a good idea and experience of anti-sanctions. As the world's largest developing country and a rapidly rising power, we must reflect on what Russia has suffered. First, at the micro level, we should constantly strengthen the legal, economic and trade tools reserve of anti-sanctions and improve the anti-sanctions mechanism. At the macro level, we will strengthen domestic economic recycling, reduce dependence on Western markets, enhance financial and economic resilience through multilateral cooperation, and defuse sanctions risks. Second, we should pay attention to new forms of warfare and recognize that the digital economy and media public opinion have become new battlefields for international competition and confrontation, and prioritize the development of core advanced technologies. Third, we should resolutely safeguard national sovereignty and interests, uphold multilateralism, fairness and justice, and adhere to all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging opening up. Fourth, food security, energy security and digital security must be prepared for a rainy day, increase production capacity, moderate imports, and scientific and technological support to better cope with the international changes and maintain social stability and national security.

It is noteworthy that the confrontation and competition between major powers have intensified the international tension, and Russia's strategic adjustment has shaped a new international pattern and a new international order. Against the backdrop of profound changes in the international landscape, only by jointly practicing multilateralism, consciously observing international laws and regulations, and strengthening coordination and communication can countries work together to make the international order fairer, more just and more equitable.

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